Taipei: Taiwan's current political deadlock reflects institutional weaknesses that were largely obscured during years of unified government, a U.S. scholar said Wednesday at a symposium in Taipei. Kharis Templeman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, argued that Taiwan's current political difficulties are largely institutional, rather than the result of partisan polarization, Chinese interference or parts of the political system rejecting liberal democratic principles.
According to Focus Taiwan, Templeman stated that Taiwan's constitutional framework is being tested for the first time, and it's not performing well under the scrutiny. President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the January 2024 presidential election with just over 40 percent of the vote, but the party lost its legislative majority. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) together hold a majority in the 113-seat Legislature. Templeman noted that this arrangement has exposed tensions that were less apparent during the previous 16 years of unified government under former Presidents Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP.
Taiwan nevertheless remains a comparatively strong democracy, Templeman said, citing international assessments including those by Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. He argued that some of the institutional weaknesses now emerging can be traced to reforms made during the 2000-2008 administration of then-President Chen Shui-bian. These include changes to the legislative electoral system, the creation of the National Communications Commission (NCC), and changes to the terms and appointment process for Constitutional Court justices. Those arrangements were rarely tested under divided government in their current form because the executive and Legislature were controlled by the same party for much of the period after 2008, he said.
Templeman highlighted the inherent tension in Taiwan's political system, describing it as functioning much like "a strong presidential regime." Both the president and Legislature have separate electoral mandates, which creates political friction. President Lai won with about 40 percent of the vote, while the largest opposition party in the legislative election also received less than a majority, leading to a situation where neither side has a strong mandate, yet both have valid claims to their positions.
Taiwan's Constitution allows for a legislative vote of no confidence in the premier to resolve serious executive-legislative conflicts. However, no such motion has passed since the constitutional amendments introduced the mechanism in 1997. If a no-confidence motion succeeds, the president can dissolve the Legislature and call new elections, which gives lawmakers little incentive to initiate such a motion. Templeman argued that the current system's prolonged conflict between the executive and the Legislature is a feature rather than a flaw of Taiwan's divided government.
Templeman also pointed out the need for an independent institution capable of resolving disputes between the executive and legislative branches. He emphasized the importance of an independent 'referee,' noting that Taiwan's current system has a glaring weakness in the appointment systems for the Constitutional Court, NCC, and other independent bodies. The appointment process can lead to perceptions of political bias, even if justices act independently. He also highlighted that the NCC faces challenges under divided government, with nominees potentially being rejected and commission seats left vacant, undermining its ability to function.
Despite these challenges, Templeman acknowledged Taiwan's institutional successes, including the central bank, Central Election Commission, and police administration, which have maintained a significant degree of independence. He suggested that Taiwan could benefit from learning from these strengths while considering institutional reform.